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AFTER JULY 1, 1997: A REPORT OF A MISSION OF
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YORK: THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS*
1. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1997, governmental authority over Hong Kong will
pass from the United Kingdom to the People's Republic of China
("China" or "the P.R.C."). The advent of Chinese rule has raised
concern beyond Hong Kong's borders about future rights of
people in Hong Kong to be free of governmental arbitrariness.
That concern, in turn, focuses sharply on preservation and
modification of Hong Kong's system of justice, the rule of law,
and independence of its judges and lawyers.
To address these questions, to determine whether and to what
extent the doubts and apprehensions concerning Hong Kong's
future are well founded, and to ascertain whether the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York ("the Association") could and
should play a meaningful role as events unfold, a mission of
inquiry was organized under the auspices of the Association's
Committee on International Human Rights, chaired by Jay
Topkis.
* The principle authors of this report are the Honorable Leonard B. Sand,
Chair, United States District Judge (Senior Judge) of the Southern District of
New York; R. Scott Greathead, a member of Owen & Davis; Monica P.
McCabe, a member of Reid & Priest; and Maurice N. Nessen, a member of
Kramer, Levin, Naftalis & Frankel. We are grateful to the John Merck Fund
and the Nate B. and Frances Spungold Foundation for underwriting the cost
of the mission.
A modified version of this report has been previously published in Volume
51 of THE RECORD, a publication of the Association o the Bar of the City of
New York.
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1.1. The Mission's Methodology
Prior to leaving for Hong Kong, the members of the mission
received helpful advice from many knowledgeable Hong Kong
watchers in New York.' The mission devoted its time in Hong
Kong to meeting with members of the Hong Kong government,
judges, legislators, leaders of the Hong Kong bar (both barristers
and solicitors), law professors, journalists, human rights advocates,
consular officials, and business leaders.2 Regrettably, the mission
could not obtain a meeting with Christopher Patten, the Gover-
nor of Hong Kong, who was in Europe for most of our visit;
however, the mission did meet with the Governor's Director of
Administration, Richard Hoare.
Everyone with whom the mission met extended a warm
welcome, encouraged the mission's efforts, and urged the Associa-
tion to maintain a continuing involvement with Hong Kong and
its legal community. The mission's recommendation that the
Association play an ongoing role as liaison with the Hong Kong
Bar Association and Law Society largely responds to these
encouragements.
1.2. The Mood In Hong Kong
During the week the mission spent in Hong Kong, October
24-31, 1995, there was intense interest and discussion of matters
relating to the 1997 transition, not only on the part of those with
whom the mission met, but also in the daily press and public
forums. The mission purposefully selected late October for the
visit to allow some dust to settle following the September 17, 1995
election for the Hong Kong Legislative Council ("Legco"). This
election resulted in a resounding victory for Martin Lee, Chair-
man of the Democratic Party, and those generally aligned with his
pro-democracy political views, such as Emily Lau, Christine Loh,
and Margaret Ng. At the same time, Tsang Yok Sing, the leader
' We particularly wish to express our appreciation to George Black of the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and to Professor Johannes Chan of the
University of Hong Kong Law School. Daniel F. Feldman, Esq., a Henry Luce
Scholar assigned to the Hong Kong office of Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton &
Garrison, coordinated our appointments and acted as an invaluable guide and
advisor.
2 A complete list of those with whom the mission members met is set




of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong
Party ("DAB party") and a prominent pro-China advocate, was
defeated. The debate of various substantive issues discussed in this
report took place in the aftermath of these election results.
Hong Kong's leaders worry about the quality and accuracy of
criticisms and expressions of concern by persons outside of Hong
Kong. Some fear that further "lecturing" from the outside will
invoke a traditional distaste for foreign intervention and be
counterproductive. This sensitivity to foreign criticism is
especially reflected in the views of Hong Kong business leaders
who fear that doubts and misapprehensions about the future,
particularly among journalists, will discourage investors from
continuing the flow of capital into the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region ("S.A.R."), as it will be known after July
1, 1997. For example, the foreign press frequently mentions a
flight of capital and residents from Hong Kong, but neglects to
mention the influx of funds and residents, despite the fact that the
net balance favors Hong Kong.
At the meetings the mission attended and in many interviews,
two particular writings disparaging Hong Kong seem to have
touched sore nerves. On June 26, 1995, Fortune Magazine, which
had earlier published an article describing Hong Kong in positive
terms, published an article by Louis Kraar, entitled The Death of
Hong Kong, predicting Hong Kong's demise as a leading financial
center.
3
The second reference is to an opinion written by a United
States district court judge in Massachusetts finding that the court
had jurisdiction over a wrongful death action brought on behalf
of the estate of a Massachusetts resident who drowned in a hotel
swimming pool in Hong Kong.4 In explaining why it had
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the Massachusetts long
arm statute and why, on the special facts of the case, there was a
sufficient nexus with Massachusetts to defeat the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court wrote:
Furthermore, the uncertain future of the Hong Kong legal
system, given the island's reversion to Chinese sovereignty
3 Louis Kraar, The Death of Hong Kong, FORTUNE, June 26, 1995, at 118.
4 See Nowak v. Tak How Inv. Ltd., 899 F. Supp. 25 PD. Mass. 1995).
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in less than two years, counsels heavily in favor of jurisdic-
tion to ensure that the Nowaks have the opportunity to
obtain redress, if any be appropriate, for the grievous loss
they have suffered.'
That this one-line statement, written by a district judge in a
wrongful death case where the issue was in no sense dispositive,
should create such resentment highlights the apprehension with
which many Hong Kong leaders view any foreign expressions of
concerns. The wishes expressed that the mission view Hong
Kong's future positively also reflects the sensitivity over represen-
tation. Although the degree of emphasis or minimization of those
issues of conflict discussed herein varied depending upon the
political orientation of the speaker, the mission heard no voices of
utter despair or great pessimism. No one admitted any intent to
leave Hong Kong, although many are said to hold foreign
passports.
There is no way, short of visiting Hong Kong, to adequately
capture the atmosphere and dynamics of the place and the
attitudes of its people. Recognizing this, there is a caveat to the
mission Report: despite efforts to keep abreast of subsequent
developments in Hong Kong, including, for example, monitoring
local press stories and meeting with Hong Kong's Solicitor
General in February, 1996,6 the mission's first-hand insights into
Hong Kong focus on late October 1995. However, recent local
press stories and the comments of Hong Kong's Solicitor General
in February 1996 indicate that there have been no significant
developments which materially alter the issues discussed or the
recommendations contained in this Report.
Section 2 briefly discusses the historical background of Hong
Kong. Section 3 describes the basic documents which will govern
Hong Kong's transition from a British Crown Colony to a
Chinese S.A.R., and reports on the four principal issues being
debated with respect to that transition: the Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance ("BORO"), the composition of the Court of Final Appeals
5 Id. at 34.
6 On February 2, 1996, Solicitor General Daniel Fung addressed a luncheon
meeting attended by members of various Association committees. His visit was
preceded in October 1995 by that of Roderick Woo, a prominent solicitor and




("CFA"), the continuation or replacement of the recently elected
Legco, and the issues relating to the Acts of State Doctrine.
Section 4 discusses the impact, apart from Hong Kong-China
relations, which the transition will have on the legal system in
Hong Kong. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the mission's
reactions and recommends continuing contact with Hong Kong's
legal community by the Association.
2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
7
Hong Kong, once a barren rock home to two thousand
fishermen, is now an international center for finance and trade
with a population of over 6.3 million people.! The island colony
has fueled the economic development of Southern China and
other parts of Southeast Asia. Although Hong Kong has
undergone this vast metamorphosis, it retains many attributes of
British colonialism, having been a colony of England since 1841.
This is particularly apparent in the Hong Kong legal system,
which replicates the English system For example, the Hong
Kong legal profession is divided between barristers and solicitors,
and conducts virtually all of its proceedings in English, despite the
fact that only thirty-eight percent of Hong Kong's residents speak
English" and only a small fraction speak it as their first language.
In considering the consequences of the end of British colonialism
and the advent of Chinese rule, it is important to examine Hong
Kong's historical evolution.
2.1. Britain and Hong Kong
The history of modern Hong Kong traces its beginning to the
first Anglo-Chinese War, better known as the Opium War, which
began in 1840." The conflict received its name from several
" Fraser L. Hunter, Jr., a member of the Committee on International
Human Rights and a former resident of Hong Kong, made major contributions
to this section of the Report.
' See Emma Batha, More Maids, Less Emigration See Population Rise, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 23, 1996, at 1.
9 See JEROME A. COHEN & JOHN E. LANGE, THE CHINESE LEGAL
SYSTEM - A PRIMER FOR INVESTORS 23 (1995).
10 See Alex Lo, Mr. and Ms. Average Moving Up in Single File, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Nov. 6, 1996, at 1.
1 See FRANK WELSH, A BORROWED PLAcE: THE HISTORY OF HONG
KONG 79-80 (1993).
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decades of cultural conflict between China and the western trading
nations over the sale of Indian-grown opium in China by British
merchants, which Chinese imperial authorities tried to stop.l"
The first Opium War was a relatively small-scale conflict.
Shortly after hostilities began, Chinese authorities in Canton
entered into negotiations to end the conflict.13 Acting without
specific authority from London, Captain Charles Elliot of the
Royal Navy; Britain's Chief Superintendent of Trade, reached an
agreement with China at Ch'uen-pi to end the hostilities in
exchange for British possession of Hong Kong.14 The Conven-
tion of Ch'uen-pi was repudiated almost immediately by both
sides, and Elliot was dismissed from his post. In the letter of
dismissal, Lord Palmerston, then Britain's Foreign Minister,
sharply denigrated Elliot's diplomatic achievement:
You have obtained the Cession of Hong Kong, a barren
island with hardly a house on it ... . Now it seems
obvious that Hong Kong will not be a Mart of Trade...
our Commercial Transactions will be carried on as
heretofore at Canton; but [the British residents] will be
able to go and build Houses to retire to, in the desert
island of Hong Kong.1
5
Following a short resumption of hostilities and period of
further negotiations, in 1842 the British enlarged upon the gains
of the Convention in the Treaty of Nanking." In addition to
enlarging British trading rights at five Chinese "Treaty ports" and
providing compensation for the destruction of opium stocks, the
Treaty formally ceded "to Her Majesty the Queen of Great
Britain... the Island of Hong-Kong, to be possessed in perpetuity
"117by Her Britannic Majesty, her heirs and successors ....
On June 26, 1843, Hong Kong formally became a British
12 See JAN MORRIS, HONG KONG 13-15 (1988).
13 See WELSH, supra note 11, at 104.
14 See Convention of Ch'uen-pi, Jan. 20, 1841; see also WELSH, supra note
11, at 104-06.
" WELSH, supra note 11, at 108.
16 Treaty of Nanking, Aug. 29, 1842, U.K.-P.R.C., 93 Consol. T.S. 465.




possession. 8 For the first time in history, China had surren-
dered territory to a foreign power. The British further enlarged
their holdings following the Second Anglo-Chinese War, securing
the southern tip of the Kowloon peninsula and nearby
Stonecutters Island in the Convention of Peking. 9 Yet even
after the second, and final, Anglo-Chinese conflict, Great Britain
still possessed only thirty-two square miles of mostly barren,
mountainous territory containing a population of just over ninety
thousand.
At the close of the nineteenth century, the Great Powers, with
the exception of the United States, maneuvered to obtain
advantageous portions of Chinese territory.20 While Russia,
France, Germany, and Japan took territory from China by force
or threat, Great Britain completed its territorial acquisition of
Hong Kong by leasing from China the remainder of the Kowloon
peninsula, its immediate hinterland, and the islands in the
archipelago surrounding Hong Kong.2 This ninety-nine-year
lease of what became known as the "New Territories" increased
the total land under British control to approximately 390 square
miles.? As history would reveal, the lease also set a time limit
on Great Britain's presence in Hong Kong.
Although Hong Kong had reached its present-day territorial
limits by the turn of the twentieth century, it was not until the
1950s that Hong Kong became the focal point for trade with
China that it is today. Indeed, throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, Shanghai was generally considered the chief
port of entry to the China market.23 The success of the Com-
munist Revolution in 1949 led Hong Kong and Shanghai to
change their relative positions.24 With the overthrow and flight
of the Nationalist government, Hong Kong saw an influx of
refugee industrialists from China and a redirection of capital away
from mainland China to Hong Kong.25 These events formed the
12 See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 18.
19 Convention of Peking (1860).
20 See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 19.
21 See id.
2' See id. at 19-20.
23 See id. at 20.
24 See id.
2s See id. at 21.
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impetus for Hong Kong's postwar growth surge. Between 1945
and 1950, Hong Kong's population quintupled to two million, and
by 1995 had reached 6.1 million. 26  Economic growth also
increased sharply in postwar Hong Kong and by the end of 1993,
Hong Kong's Gross Domestic Product exceeded Great Britain's on
a per capita basis.
Following the Communist Revolution in 1949, several events
occurred in China and elsewhere which figured in the historical
forces that resulted in the agreement reached in 1984 between
Britain and China providing for Hong Kong's reversion to
Chinese rule. First, the unrest in China generated by the Great
Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution caused smaller but
significant upheavals in Hong Kong.' In May 1962, seventy
thousand Chinese refugees came to Hong Kong to escape the
famine and shortages resulting from the catastrophic failure of the
Great Leap Forward.28 Five years later, during the Cultural
Revolution, the Red Guards nearly sacked the British Embassy in
Beijing. Although Hong Kong escaped outright invasion by the
Red Guards,29 it suffered through a summer of violent riots and
terrorist acts.30 These events, which were likely monitored, if
not actually directed, by the Chinese government, highlighted
Hong Kong's rather obvious vulnerability to China.
For the Hong Kong Chinese, another particularly significant
event was Great Britain's enactment of the Immigration Act of
1971. 3 ' The Immigration Act
conferred the right of abode in the United Kingdom only
on 'citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies who
[were] connected with Britain by birth, adoption, natural-
ization or registration or [were] children or grandchildren
of such persons ... or who [had] been resident in Britain
26 See id. at 351.
27 See generally, WELSH, supra note 11, at 465-70.
2 See MORRIS, supra note 12, at 306.
29 See WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF CHINA: How ECONOMIc
REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPERPOWER 205 (1993). In 1967, when Red
Guards approached the Hong Kong border, Premier Zhou Enlai reportedly
issued ordes to the local army commander to stop them. See id.
3 See WELSH, supra note 11, at 466-68.




for a continuous period of five years ... '32
The Act defined persons who managed to meet this criteria as
"patrials."33 Very few Hong Kong Chinese qualified.34 Despite
130 years of British sovereignty, Parliament denied the vast
majority of Hong Kong's Chinese the right to live in Great
Britain.
If the Immigration Act of 1971 and the expiration of the lease
on the New Territories in 1997 provide the canvas on which
Hong Kong's subsequent history is written, two other events in
the early 1970s provide a prelude to that history. President
Nixon's secret trip to China in late February 1972, and the result-
ing "Shanghai Communique," acknowledged the extent of the
West's interest in re-establishing relations with mainland China.3"
Part of the price of this renewed relationship included recognition
of China's territorial claim to Taiwan. As the Communique
stated, "[t]he United States acknowledges that all Chinese on
either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not
challenge that position."36 If Great Britain's closest ally, the
United States, was willing to compromise on Taiwan to gain
relations with China, Hong Kong's future as a British territory
was certainly in some question.
Less than five days after the Shanghai Communique, China
requested that the United Nations Committee on Decolonization
drop Hong Kong from the list of colonial territories.37 As the
Chinese representative explained:
The question of Hong Kong and Macao belong to the
category of questions resulting from the series of unequal
treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong
Kong and Macao are part of Chinese territory occupied by
the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of
32 WELSH, supra note 11, at 473 (citing Immigration Act 1971).
33 Immigration Act 1971, pt. 1, ch. 2(6).
1 See WELSH, supra note 11, at 473.
35 See id. at 470-71.
316 Id. at 471.
37 See id.
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the questions of Hong Kong and Macao is entirely within
China's sovereign right[.]38
Although Great Britain could have objected to China's request on
the grounds that Hong Kong (apart from the New Territories)
had been ceded to the United Kingdom in perpetuity, Great
Britain did not object.39 Instead, one week later, Britain and
China issued a joint communique calling for embassies in London
and Beijing and affirming "principles of mutual respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity."40 The die for Hong Kong's
future had been cast.
2.2. Hong Kong and the People-s Republic of China
The P.R.C.'s posture toward Hong Kong is driven by two
divergent views that must be reconciled. On the one hand, the
P.R.C. has always considered Hong Kong's existence as a foreign
territory on its border an abhorrent reminder of the Opium Wars
and of China's humiliation at the hands of Great Britain during
the nineteenth century, which can only be overcome by restoring
Hong Kong as part of China. This view sees restoration of Hong
Kong to China as a matter of pride and of righting historical
wrongs. On the other hand, China's Communist rulers have
made it a policy not to jeopardize Hong Kong's prosperity and its
role as Southeast Asia's principal financial center. In light of this
view, it makes no economic sense to restore Hong Kong to its
nineteenth century status.
China has long had the means and a colorable pretext for
regaining Hong Kong by force, as India did with the Portuguese
colony of Goa in 1961, and Indonesia did in 1975 with East
Timor, also a former Portuguese colony.4 The P.R.C. never
recognized the legal validity of the nineteenth century treaties
ceding Hong Kong to Britain.42 Hong Kong has always been
38 Id.
39 See id. at 471-72.
40 Id. at 472.
41 See OVERHOLT, supra note 29, at 206.
42 See PETER WESLEY-SMITH, UNEQUAL TREATY: 1898-1997, CHINA,
GREAT BRITAiN AND HONG KONG'S NEW TERRITORIES 3 (1980) cited in
Richard Klein, Law and Racism in an Asian Setting: An Analysis of the British




vulnerable to recovery by force - since World War II, it has been
lightly defended by a relatively small British garrison, and
according to many long-time residents the mission encountered,
the Chinese might have had to do little more than turn off the
water supply and cut off food supplies from the mainland. But
rather than pursue its nationalist impulses to recover Hong Kong
forcibly, the P.R.C. maintained the status quo.
The wisdom of China's hands-off policy toward Hong Kong
is vividly illustrated by the British territory's contribution to
China's extraordinary economic growth since the beginning of
Chinese economic reform in 1979.' 3 The transformation began
in China's Guangdong Province, which borders Hong Kong.
Once a relatively poor, agricultural district, Guangdong had a
large and cheap labor force - wages were only ten percent of
those in Hong Kong - and, unlike crowded Hong Kong, plenty
of land for new factory sites. 44 With the benefit of capital,
technology, and management skills supplied by capitalist entrepre-
neurs from Hong Kong, between 1978 and 1992 Guangdong's
economy achieved an annual real growth rate of over twelve
percent.45 Since 1979, two-thirds of all foreign investment in
China has come from Hong Kong.46
In the late 1970s, China's Communist leaders reportedly saw
three options available to them: leaving Hong Kong in the hands
of the British indefinitely, recovering Hong Kong by force, or
resuming sovereignty over Hong Kong while retaining the benefits
of the existing capitalist system.47 China chose the third option
and, in 1981, commenced negotiations with the British govern-
ment 48 leading toward the restoration of Chinese sovereignty
over Hong Kong under terms that would preserve its capitalist
economy and lifestyle by creating, in the often-quoted words of
Deng Xiaoping, "one country, two systems."
43 See OVERHOLT, supra note 29, at 183.
44 See id. at 186.
41 See id. at 183, 186.
46 See id. at 195.
47 See id. at 206.
41 See id. at 206-07.
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3. THE TRANSFER OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE GOVERNING
DOCUMENTS AND PRINCIPAL ISSUES
The basic terms under which China would resume governmen-
tal authority over Hong Kong are set out in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, which was signed by
the British and Chinese governments on December 19, 1984. 49
The Joint Declaration sets forth general principles agreed to by
the two governments to guarantee under Chinese rule a high
degree of autonomy and basic rights for Hong Kong and its
citizens. To the extent that agreements on paper offer a guide, the
Joint Declaration is the primary documentary source for drawing
any conclusions about the future of Hong Kong's legal system
under Chinese rule.
Further details of the transition are supplied in two subse-
quently adopted documents agreed to by both governments: the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
Republic of China, adopted by the P.R.C.'s National People's
Congress ("NPC") on April 4, 1990;"0 and the Agreement
between the British and Chinese Sides on the Question of the
Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong, signed on June 9, 1995,"
the terms of which were enacted by Legco as the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal Ordinance on July 1, 1995.
A third document, the Bill of Rights Ordinance, 2 was
adopted without China's approval by Hong Kong's Legco on June
8, 1991. While the BORO provides an additional basis for
confidence in Hong Kong's future, the Chinese government's
objections to it have caused some political leaders in Hong Kong
to question China's intention to carry out the commitments it has
made to preserve Hong Kong's freedoms.
"' Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
" The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (Apr. 4, 1990), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520
[hereinafter Basic Law].
s1 Agreement Between the British and Chinese Sides on the Question of
the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong, June 9, 1995, P.R.C.-U.K.
[hereinafter Court of Final Appeal Agreement].
" Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Ordinance No. 59 (1991)




3.1. The Sino-British Joint Declaration
The Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong
commits Britain to restoring Hong Kong to the P.R.C. on July 1,
1997, and obligates China to establish the Hong Kong S.A.R. on
that date. 3 The Joint Declaration is most remarkable for the
extraordinary degree of autonomy China agrees to cede to the
new government of the Hong Kong S.A.R., which is perhaps
unprecedented for a government recovering sovereignty over
former colonial territory.T 4
In its preamble and first section, the Joint Declaration
articulates the two goals of the Chinese government: first, "to
recover the Hong Kong area," which the P.R.C. declares "is the
common aspiration of the entire Chinese people;"15 and second,
to accomplish this by a negotiated settlement that "is conducive
to the maintenance of the prosperity and stability of Hong
Kong." 6 The agreement does not expressly address the degree
to which restoring capitalist Hong Kong as an integral part of
Communist China, while preserving Hong Kong's prosperity and
stability, may be perceived to be potentially competing objectives.
The remainder of the Joint Declaration seeks to reconcile these
goals in a series of "declarations" agreed to by the two govern-
ments. The most significant points include:
(1) The Hong Kong S.A.R. will be "directly under the
authority of the Central People's Government" of the
P.R.C., but "will enjoy a high degree of autonomy, except
51 China amended its Constitution in 1982 to add Article 31, which permits
the creation of special administrative regions within the state where socialism
will not be practiced and the existing social and economic systems will remain
unchanged. China adopted the amendment to accommodate the reacquisition
of sovereignty over Taiwan as well as Hong Kong. See CHRISTINE LOH,
HONG KONG "A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTONOMY" AND THE BASIC LAW 18-21
(1995).
"' See Joint Declaration, supra note 49, para. 3(2). The Joint Declaration
was registered as a treaty with the United Nations, pursuant to Article 102 of
the U.N. Charter, and as such, its provisions are enforceable under internation-
al law.
51 Id. para. 1.
" Id. pmbl.
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in foreign and defence affairs...
(2) The Hong Kong S.A.R. will be "vested with executive,
legislative and independent judicial power, including that
of final adjudication," and "[t]he laws currently in force in
Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.""8
(3) The Hong Kong S.A.R.'s government "will be com-
posed of local inhabitants" and will be headed by a chief
executive appointed by the Chinese government "on the
basis of the results of elections or consultations to be held
locally." Current employees of the Hong Kong govern-
ment, both Chinese and foreign nationals, may remain in
their jobs, and British and other foreign nationals may
serve as advisers or hold "certain public posts." 9
(4) "The current social and economic systems in Hong
Kong will remain unchanged, and so will the life-style.
Rights and freedoms, including those of the person, of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of travel,
of movement, of correspondence, of strike, of choice of
occupation, of academic research and of religious belief will
be ensured by law . ... Private property, ownership of
enterprises, legitimate right of inheritance and foreign
investment will be protected by law."10
In addition, the Chinese government agreed to enact the "basic
policies" laid out in the Joint Declaration in a "Basic Law" to be
adopted by the NPC, and confirmed that these policies "will
remain unchanged for 50 years."61
In Annex I to the Joint Declaration, the Chinese government
"elaborated" on the basic policies it agreed to in the main
document. Some of these "elaborations" reinforce the concept of
the Hong Kong S.A.R.'s autonomy. Others presage issues that
have come to bedevil the transition process.
Annex I provides that all laws in force in Hong Kong prior to




60 Id. para. 3(5).




the Basic Law" or that are amended by the legislature of the Hong
Kong S.A.R" These include "the common law, rules of equity,
ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law."63 Annex
I affirms the basic "rights and freedoms" provided in existing law
that will be maintained and protected by the S.A.R. government,
including some that are not explicitly listed in the main body of
the Joint Declaration.' It also explicitly provides that the
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR) 65 and the International Covenant on Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights6 "as applied to Hong Kong shall
remain in force."
67
The inclusion of the two international human rights covenants
is significant, as China has not signed either instrument. Howev-
er, the Chinese government has objected to the 1991 enactment by
Hong Kong's Legco of a Bill of Rights Ordinance modeled on the
ICCPR because it results in the repeal of certain British laws
restricting press and other freedoms that were in effect at the time
of the Joint Declaration and which the P.R.C. wants to maintain.
Controversy has also risen over two "elaborations" in Annex
I of the Joint Declaration dealing with the S.A.R.'s legislature and
its CFA. Annex I specifies that the legislature of the Hong Kong
S.A.R. "shall be constituted by elections."6' This provision is
significant since when the Joint Declaration was signed in 1984,
Hong Kong's Legco, a vestige of colonial rule, had no elected
members. When Britain proposed that the first direct Legco
elections take place in 1991 for eighteen of Legco's sixty members,
the Chinese objected, preferring a smaller number. This disagree-
62 Id. annex 1, II.
63 Id.
6' Id. annex I, $ XlII. The list of rights and freedoms contained in Section
XII of Annex I includes the following rights not included in the list set forth
in the main body of the Joint Declaration: the rights "to form and join trade
unions," "of demonstration," of "inviolability of the home," and "the freedom
to marry and the right to raise a family freely." Id.
65 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
reprinted in 6 I.L.M 368 (1967).
66 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976),
reprinted in 6 IL.M. 360.
67 Joint Declaration, supra note 49, annex I, § XIII.
68 Id. annex I, § I.
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ment led to an impasse69 that continues to this day regarding the
composition and manner of selection of the S.A.R.'s first legisla-
ture following the transfer of authority in 1997.'0
Annex I also provides for the creation of a court of final
appeal which shall exercise "the power of final judgment" of the
S.A.R., replacing the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
London, which presently serves as the highest level of appeal for
Hong Kong's judicial system."1 It further specifies that the
S.A.R.'s chief executive will appoint the members of the CFA
with the endorsement of the legislature, and that the CFA may
include "judges from other common law jurisdictions."72 The
composition of the CFA, particularly the number of foreign
judges who would be permitted to sit on it, has led to controver-
sy.7
3
Finally, in Annex II to the Joint Declaration, the two
governments establish a Joint Liaison Group composed of
representatives from both sides who will meet regularly to consult
on the implementation of the Joint Declaration and discuss other
matters relating to the "smooth transfer" of authority in 1997.74
3.2. The Basic Law
On April 4, 1990, the NPC adopted the Basic Law, which on
July 1, 1997 becomes the Hong Kong S.A.R.'s "constitution,"5
replacing the Letters Patent, the document issued under the
Queen's hand that establishes the basic framework of the colonial
government.7 6 Article 2 repeats the Joint Declaration in granting
the Hong Kong S.A.R. "a high degree of autonomy and ...
executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including
that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this
69 See infra section 3.2.3.
7' See The Secret Documents: The Original 1990 Texts of the Hidden Sino-
British Exchanges on the 1995 Elections in Hong Kong, WINDOW MAG., 1994;
Hong Kong Government Information Services, HONG KONG 24-25 (1995).
" See Joint Declaration, supra note 49, annex I, S M.
72 Id.
7' See discussion infra section 3.3.
4 See Joint Declaration, supra note 49, annex II.
I Basic Law, supra note 50.




Law."' Although Article 159 provides that the NPC can amend
the Basic Law,78 any amendment presumably must conform with
the Joint Declaration.
The Basic Law is structured to follow the "basic policies" of
the Joint Declaration.7 9 The Basic Law provides that all of Hong
Kong's existing laws shall be maintained except for any that
contravene the Basic Law or are amended by the S.A.R.'s
legislature. 0 It reiterates the basic rights of the S.A.R.'s residents
that are set out in the Joint Declaration8 and expressly adds the
right to freedom from "arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or
imprisonment" and the prohibition of "torture" and "arbitrary or
unlawful deprivation of... life."8 2 The Basic Law also provides
that the two international human rights covenants "shall remain
in force," adding that they "shall be implemented through the
laws" of the S.A.R.
83
3.2.1. The Acts of State Issue and Other Limits on
Autonomy
Certain provisions of the Basic Law seem to undercut the Joint
Declaration's promise of a "high degree of autonomy" and its
guarantees of basic rights. 4 The most troubling are Article 19,
which deprives the S.A.R.'s courts of jurisdiction "over acts of
state such as defence [sic] and foreign affairs,"8 ' and Article 158,
which vests the ultimate "power of interpretation" of the Basic
Law in the Standing Committee of the NPC rather than the
courts.
86
Article 158 reflects what is perhaps the most significant
difference between the Chinese and British systems of law.
I Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 2.
71 See id. art. 159.
71 See id. pmbl.
so See id. art. 8.
" See Joint Declaration, supra note 49, annex I, S XIII, XIV. These rights
are set forth in Chapter I of the Basic Law as "Fundamental Rights and
Duties of the Residents." Basic Law, supra note 50. The only "duty" specified
is "the obligation to abide by the laws in force" in the S.A.R. See id. art. 42.
s Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 28.
s Id. art. 39.
s See Joint Declaration, supra note 49, para. 3(2).
s Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 19.
16 Id. art. 158.
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Unlike the British and U.S. systems, where the courts operate
independently as the final interpreters of the law, the P.R.C.'S
courts "are subject to tight political control" and are subordinate
to the NPC, whose Standing Committee has the power to
interpret the Constitution.7
The effect of Article 158 is mitigated by a clause requiring the
NPC to authorize the S.A.R.'s courts to interpret the Basic Law
on their own in cases that are "within the limits of the [S.A.R.'s]
autonomy.""8 Still, the courts must abide by the interpretation of
the NPC's Standing Committee in cases "concerning affairs which
are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or
concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and
the Region." 9
When read with Article 19, Article 158 gives the Standing
Committee the unreviewable authority to determine what cases
fall within the definition of "acts of state" and thus fall outside the
jurisdiction of the S.A.R.'s courts. These provisions have raised
concern among many Hong Kong lawyers and legislators that the
Standing Committee will expansively interpret "acts of state" for
political or doctrinal reasons in ways that will seriously undercut
the S.A.R.'s autonomy and the independence of its courts.90
Another troubling provision is Article 23, which requires the
S.A.R.'s legislature to enact laws prohibiting a variety of crimes
that include "subversion against the Central People's Government"
and "theft of state secrets." 91 This provision has raised fears that
these laws will be used against critics of Beijing and to restrict free
expression. 92  Under Chinese criminal law, "subversion"
17 COHEN &LANGE, supra note 9, at 5, 24.
s Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 158.
89 Id. In interpreting the Basic Law, the Standing Committee is required
to consult with its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong S.A.R., a
twelve member committee appointed by the Standing Committee, six of whom
must be Hong Kong residents. See id. art 158, app.
9o These concerns are compounded by Article 17 of the Basic Law, which
empowers the NPC's Standing Committee to invalidate laws that it finds are
"not in conformity" with the Basic Law "regarding affairs within the
responsibility of the Central Authorities" or the relationship between the
Central Authorities and the S.A.R. Id. art. 17.
91 Id. art. 23.
92 See ARTICLE 19 AND THE HONG KONG JOURNAUSTS ASSOCIATION,





criminalizes counter-revolutionary acts with the intent of
overthrowing the political power of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and the socialist system." In a recent criminal case in
the P.R.C., a Beijing-based journalist for Hong Kong's Ming Pao
newspaper was convicted of "theft of state secrets" and was
sentenced to imprisonment for twelve years after he acquired
information concerning undisclosed interest rate changes and
international gold transactions planned by the People's Bank of
China.94
3.2.2. The S.A.R. s Chief Executive and Legislative
Council
Other important provisions of the Basic Law deal with the
selection of the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive and legislature, and the
composition of its CFA. Articles 45 and 68, respectively, provide
that the "ultimate aim" is to elect the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive
and its legislature by "universal suffrage," but that the method of
selection will be determined "in light of the actual situation" in
the S.A.R. and "in accordance with the principle of gradual and
orderly progress.""' The qualifying language reflects the Chinese
government's post-Tiananmen concern that the democratic process
in the S.A.R. not run free. The details of the selection process are
spelled out in two annexes to the Basic Law,96 and in the text of
the Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for
the Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative
Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region."
The Central People's Government will appoint the first Chief
Executive based on a recommendation by a "broadly representa-
tive" Selection Committee composed of four hundred permanent
93 See LOH, supra note 53, at 30 n.6 (citing Articles 90-104 of the Criminal
Law of the P.R.C.).
94 See ARTICLE 19 AND THE HONG KONG JOURNALISTS ASSOCIATION,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN HONG KONG: 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 22-23
(1994).
95 Basic Law, supra note 50, arts. 45 & 68.
96 See id. annexes I & II.
7 Decision of the National People's Congress on the Method for the
Formation of the First Government and the First Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, adopted Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.)
[hereinafter Decision of the National People's Congress].
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Hong Kong residents.98 Subsequent Chief Executives will be
elected by a "broadly representative" Election Committee
composed of eight hundred Hong Kong residents, who will vote
for candidates "nominated jointly" by at least one hundred
members of the Election Committee.99 After the year 2007, the
selection process can be changed by a two-thirds vote of the
S.A.R.'s Legislative Council, subject to the consent of the Chief
Executive and the approval of the Standing Committee of the
NPC.10
The S.A.R.'s first Legislative Council will serve a two-year
term and will consist of sixty members, of whom twenty will be
directly elected by geographic constituencies, thirty will be elected
by functional constituencies, and ten will be elected by the
Election Committee.0 1 For the second and third Legislative
Councils, which will serve four-year terms, the number of
directly-elected members will increase to twenty-four and thirty,
respectively."2 After 2007, the manner of selection can be
changed in the same manner as for the Chief Executive. 3
3.2.3. The Legco Through-Train Issue
A heated and increasingly contentious issue is whether the
members of Legco elected in 1995, who will have two years
remaining in their terms, can retain their seats and become
members of the first S.A.R. Legislative Council. This so-called
"through-train" issue is the subject of an ongoing dispute, arising
out of the Chinese government's discontent with the British
government's expansion of the franchise for the 1995 Legco
elections without the NPC's approval."°  In addition, the
substantial majority of those elected won their seats in part by the
votes of pro-democracy critics of Beijing. The PR.C.'s "Decision"
on the formation of the S.A.R.'s first legislature would permit
sitting Legco members to retain their seats, but only if certain
98 See id.
99 See Basic Law, supra note 50, annex I.
100 See id.
101 See Decision of the National People's Congress, supra note 97.
102 See Basic Law, supra note 50, annex II.
103 See id.
104 Tsang Yok Sing, Danger of a Legal Vacuum, S. CHINA MORNING POST,




conditions were met, including the requirement that the rules for
the 1995 Legco elections conform to the Basic Law. The Chinese
government asserts that these conditions were not met and that it
will install a new legislature in 1997.105
The Hong Kong officials who met with mission members
recognized the importance of a smooth transition by permitting
the Legco elected in 1995 to continue as the S.A.R.'s first Legisla-
tive Council. According to Tsang Yok Sing, the chairman of the
pro-Beijing DAB Party, the "'through train' had been taken for
granted when the Basic Law was drafted.""' 6  The Chinese
government first signaled its unwillingness to allow the through-
train in 1993, when negotiations between the British and Chinese
governments regarding the terms of the 1995 election broke
down." The results of these elections only hardened the
P.R.C.'s position, despite the commitment to "universal suffrage"
it made in the Basic Law.1
08
The biggest winner in the 1995 Legco elections was the
Democratic Party, founded by Martin Lee and other critics of
Beijing after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, which won
twelve of twenty directly-elected seats, and seven indirectly-elected
seats.1" Immediately after the results were in, a Chinese govern-
ment spokesman announced, "[t]he last legislature of the British
administration in Hong Kong will end on June 30, 1997 .... The
attitude of the Chinese Government on this issue is consistent and
will not change and will not be influenced by the result of the
election."1 0
The P.R.C. further signaled its obvious discomfort with the
outcome of the 1995 elections on December 28, 1995, when it
named the 150 members of the Preparatory Committee, which
will prescribe the method of forming the S.A.R.'s first govern-
ment and Legislative Council.1 The Preparatory Committee
105 See Edward A. Gargan, Pro.China Party Appears Big Loser in Hong Kong
Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at AS.
106 Sing, supra note 104, at 24.
107 See id.
101 See Basic Law, supra note 50, arts. 45 & 68.
109 See Edward A. Gargan, China and Hong Kong Victors Square Off After
the Election, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1995, at AS.
110 Id.
... See Connie Law & Louis Won, Warning of Threat to Autonomy, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 29, 1995, at 5.
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replaces the Preliminary Working Committee ("PWC"), a body
appointed by the P.R.C. in mid-1993 to serve as an advisory
"shadow government" in Hong Kong. Of the ninety-four
members of the Preparatory Committee from Hong Kong, more
than fifty are leading representatives of the colony's business
community, who have been relatively uncritical of the P.R.C.'s
positions on the new government. Twenty-nine seats went to
political party representatives who mostly follow Beijing's wishes.
The Democratic Party won no seats.
112
One new member of the Preparatory Committee, Allen Lee
Peng-fei, the Chairman of the pro-business Liberal Party, justified
the make-up of the group by stressing that "[b]usinessmen's
confidence . . . [and] presence on the committee is of vital
importance .... After all, Hong Kong means business."'
To date, the Preparatory Committee has done little to
encourage those who hoped the S.A.R.'s first Legislative Council
would be as independent and democratic as the present Legco. At
its first plenary session in Beijing on January 26, 1996, one of the
Preparatory Committee's first items of business was to adopt rules
mandating the "confidentiality" of its proceedings and "collective
responsibility" for final decisions "to avoid confusion in the final
phase of transition."114 According to press accounts, under these
rules members may not leak confidential information, quote
statements by other members, disclose the agenda of discussions
before its public announcement, or publicly oppose a decision that
has been finalized by the Preparatory Committee. Even Mr.
Allen Lee Peng-fei recognized the problem this presents for public
involvement in the important decisions that the body will be
making over the next few months, reportedly asking, "[h]ow can
we consult the public if Hong Kong people don't know what's on
the committee agenda?" 6
Then, as anticipated, on March 24, 1996, the Preparatory
Committee voted to replace Legco with an appointed council as
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Chris Yeung & No Kwai-Yan, Rules to Avoid 'Confusion: Handover
Body Starts Work but Insists on Collective Responsibility, S. CHINA MORNING






of July 1, 1997, an action which Governor Patten referred to as
"a black day for democracy in Hong Kong."117 Hong Kong media
reported that only one person on the 150 member Preparatory
Committee, Frederick Fung, voted to keep Legco for its full
term.' It is further reported that Fung, a local lawmaker, will
be excluded from sitting on the provisional body that will replace
Legco." 9 Although this action of the Preparatory Committee
was not a surprise, it was a disappointment and has raised the
level of anxiety of those who are apprehensive that China will not
tolerate political independence in Hong Kong.120
3.2.4. The S.A.R. s Judiciary and Court of Final Appeal
Chapter IV, Section 4, of the Basic Law implements the
commitment in the Joint Declaration to maintain "[t]he judicial
system previously practiced in Hong Kong"12' with courts that
"shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any
interference."1'2 That system is to include a CFA. It also
reiterates the language of the Joint Declaration providing that the
CFA may include "judges from other common law jurisdic-
tions."12
Since the Basic Law does not come into effect until July 1,
1997, it cannot provide for an earlier establishment of a CFA to
replace the Privy Council. All political factions in Hong Kong in
1991 viewed a quicker formation of the CFA as necessary to effect
a "smooth transition" in the appellate process. This has resulted
in four years of contentious negotiations between the British and
Chinese governments that finally produced the CFA Agreement,
signed on June 9, 1995, and a controversy over the CFA's
composition and jurisdiction.




12 See Edward A. Gargan, In Its Takeover Overture, China Calls the Tune,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1996, at A4.
121 Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 81.
122 Id. art. 85.
123 Id. art. 82.
19971
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
3.3. The Court of Final Appeal Agreement
Hong Kong has a distinctly British-style court system com-
prised of several levels.1 24  The lowest level consists of the
Magistrate's Courts, which have jurisdiction over relatively minor
criminal offenses and which are staffed by sixty-eight magistrates.
The next level is the District Court, which has limited civil and
criminal jurisdiction, and consists of thirty judges. Above that is
the Supreme Court, which is comprised of the High Court and
the Court of Appeal. The High Court is Hong Kong's court of
general jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases and is staffed by
twenty-three judges. The Court of Appeal hears appeals from the
High Court and the District Court. The Chief Justice and nine
Justices of Appeal sit on the Court of Appeal, where they
typically hear approximately nine hundred civil and criminal
appeals each year.1'2
Appeals from the Court of Appeal can be made to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council in London. According to
officials, because of the time and expense involved, generally less
than ten cases are appealed to the Privy Council per year. This
is the only element of the Hong Kong judicial system that
requires replacement upon the transfer of sovereignty. Many
hoped to replace the Privy Council with a CFA that would be in
place prior to July 1, 1997, and that would duplicate as nearly as
possible the high quality of the Law Lords in London. To them,
the CFA Agreement is a major disappointment.
The CFA Agreement was originally intended to provide for
the operation of the CFA prior to the 1997 transfer of authori-
ty.126 The consensus was that early functioning was needed to
maintain confidence in Hong Kong's judicial system and to avoid
delays or prejudice to appeals to the Privy Council that could not
be decided by July 1, 1997.1"' An agreement was also necessary
to address the details of the CFA's composition that were not
specified in the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law.
In 1991, the British and Chinese governments, through the
121 See COHEN & LANGE, supra note 9, at 23.
125 See Hong Kong Government Information Services, HONG KONG 1995,
49-58, Appendix 46.





Joint Liaison Group, agreed in principle on the early establish-
ment of the CFA." The agreement provided also that the CFA
would be comprised of five judges: a Chief Justice, who must be
a Chinese national; three permanent Hong Kong judges, who
could be local or expatriate; and a fifth non-permanent judge, who
would come from a list of non-permanent Hong Kong judges or
from another common-law jurisdiction"
The Joint Liaison Group reached this agreement without
consulting with Hong Kong's legal community or Legco, and it
was vigorously opposed. The Bar Association and a number of
Legco members, led by Martin Lee, argued that the CFA must be
permitted to invite more overseas judges to sit, in order to ensure
that it would maintain the high caliber and independence that
they were accustomed to with the Privy Council. Fearing defeat
of the proposed CFA legislation in Legco, the Hong Kong
government deferred the issue while negotiations within the Joint
Liaison Group continued. 30
When the final CFA Agreement was reached in June, 1995, it
contained three principal features. First, it deferred establishment
of the CFA until July 1, 1997.131 Second, it reaffirmed the 1991
agreement providing for a five-member CFA, with no more than
one foreign judge selected and permitted to sit on a case. Third,
the Agreement provided that legislation creating the CFA would
exclude from its jurisdiction "acts of state," as provided in Article
19 of the Basic Law.
13 2
On June 14, the Hong Kong government submitted a bill to
Legco implementing the CFA Agreement, where it was vigorously
debated. The legislation was opposed by the Bar Association and
Martin Lee, the leader of the Democratic Party, who said that the
CFA Agreement meant that "the rule of law is finished in Hong
Kong. "133
Although the bill passed Legco (which then included three
colonial Government officers and eighteen members appointed by
128 See id.
129 See id. at 25.
131 See LOH, supra note 53, at 82-84.
13 See Martin Lee, The Sell-Out That Has to Stop, S. CHINA MORNING
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the Governor), the repercussions of the debate were undoubtedly
felt in last September's elections, in which Mr. Lee's Democratic
party scored a landslide victory. Although some Hong Kong
leaders regard the CFA issue as having been fully resolved,13 4 at
one time Mr. Lee threatened to submit to Legco a bill amending
the CFA Ordinance to allow more foreign judges, to narrow the
definition of "acts of state," and to put the Court into place before
1997.135
The issue of how the CFA will be established remains one of
deep concern to many in Hong Kong. An independent and
highly qualified judiciary especially at the highest level, is crucial
to maintaining the rule of law, as well as the confidence of
overseas investors who rely on the independence and quality of
Hong Kong's courts and the availability of appeal to the Privy
Council. To many, the quality and independence of the S.A.R.'s
Court of Final Appeal symbolizes the stature of the entire judicial
system.
The advocates of creating a CFA with two or more overseas
judges argue that such foreign involvement is necessary (1) because
the pool of judicial talent in Hong Kong is too small to ensure the
selection of a high quality court; (2) to ensure that the CFA has
the world class reputation required to maintain the confidence of
the world financial community; (3) to enable Hong Kong's legal
system to maintain contacts with other common law jurisdictions;
and (4) to allow the CFA to maintain its independence from
governmental influence.
While these are compelling objectives, some of them could be
accomplished with the presence of the single overseas judge
permitted under the present CFA Agreement. Moreover, based
on the caliber and experience of the members of the Hong Kong
bar and bench, the "talent pool" in Hong Kong is sufficient to
create a highly qualified CFA. 13s
13 Solicitor General of Hong Kong, Daniel Fung, Remarks at an
Association of the Bar of the City of New York Luncheon (Feb. 2, 1996)
[hereinafter Remarks]; see supra note 6.
13 See Martin Lee, Courting Disaster, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 14,
1995.
136 Two proposals to broaden the field of judicial candidates being discussed
by members of the Hong Kong legal community would appear to warrant
ffirther consideration. One proposa-would permit retired judges, at some time
after leaving the bench, to return to practice before the courts on which they




To those who doubt the good faith of the RR.C. in carrying
out its commitment to maintain Hong Kong's institutions and
autonomy, the most compelling argument in favor of appointing
more overseas judges is the need to ensure the continued indepen-
dence of the judiciary after 1997. The continuation of an
independent judiciary is essential to the rule of law in Hong
Kong. A key element is the judicial selection process itself.
It appears that under the process, the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive
will appoint members of the Judicial Officers Recommendation
Commission ("JORC") from among the Hong Kong judiciary,
members of the legal profession, and other eminent individu-
als. 37  Upon the recommendation of the JORC, and with the
approval of the Legislative Council, the Chief Executive will
appoint the Chief Justice and the judges of the CFA.
Legco members Martin Lee and Christine Loh, among others,
have warned that the selection of the Chief Justice and CFA
judges will be controlled by China's "hand-picked team" and have
criticized the lack of institutional guarantees of the independence
of the JORC.13' These are legitimate concerns, and the entire
process is one that must be monitored carefully by all who are
concerned about maintaining the rule of law and the high quality
of Hong Kong's judicial system.
3.4. The Bill of Rights Ordinance
When the United Kingdom ratified the ICCPR on May 20,
1976, it expressly extended its application to Hong Kong, with
certain reservations.'39 Although China has not signed the
ICCPR,"'4 it agreed in the Joint Declaration that the Covenant
procedures which prohibit judges from returning to private practice are a
significant deterrent to many who might otherwise seek judicial office.
Elevation to the bench of solicitors, as well as barristers, which is only recently
occurring, would also broaden the pool of aspirants to judicial office.
137 See Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 88; Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance, pt. 1, 6-7; Joint Liaison Group, Submission on the Joint Liaison
Group Agreement and the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Bill (uly 3, 1995).
138 LOH, supra note 53, at 83; Lee, Courting Disaster, supra note 135.
139 These included a reservation of the right not to a pply Article 25(b) of
the ICCPR to the extent that it may require the establishment of an elected
Executive or Legislative Council in Hong Kong. See THE HONG KONG BILL
OF RIGHTS: A COMPARATE APPROACH 665-66 (Johannes Chan & Yash Ghai
eds., 1993) [hereinafter A COMPARATiVE APPROACH].
140 See discussion supra section 3.1.
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"as applied to Hong Kong shall remain in force."" 1
Like Britain, Hong Kong never had a formal, written bill of
rights, and there appears to have been no serious movement to
adopt one until the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989
aroused popular concerns in Hong Kong over the future of civil
and political liberties under Chinese rule. 42 A number of well-
placed observers contend that the British government's decision to
enact a Bill of Rights in Hong Kong - announced by Hong
Kong's Governor, Lord Wilson, in October 1989 - was intended
to quiet those fears and to keep the transfer of sovereignty on
track.'43
The adoption of a Bill of Rights presented two dilemmas. The
first was how to make it superior to other laws - a doctrine the
British call "entrenchment" - in view of British law that appeared
to limit the authority of Hong Kong's Legco to enact entrenched
legislation. t 4" The second dilemma was how to meet Chinese
government objections that a Bill of Rights would violate the
Joint Declaration by effecting a fundamental change in the nature
of the Hong Kong legal system.' 4
The first legal problem was met by a 1991 amendment of the
Letters Patent" - Hong Kong's constitutional instrument -
which authorized the enactment of laws implementing the ICCPR
in Hong Kong and barred the future enactment of laws inconsis-
tent with the Covenant:
The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations on 16 December 1966, as applied to Hong
Kong, shall be implemented through the laws of Hong
141 Joint Declaration, supra note 49, annex I, S XM.
142 See A COMPARATiVE APPROACH, supra note 139, at 2, 4.
143 For a discussion of the origins of the BORO, see Yash Ghai, The Bill
of Rights and the Basic Law: Inconsistent or Complementary? (June 18, 1994)
(unpu lished manuscri t presented at a seminar organized by the University of
Hong Kong Faculty oLaw, on file with the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Committee of International Human Rights).
144 See id. at 3-4. The obstacle was the Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865,
"which cast doubts about the ability of the Hong Kong Legco, as an unrepre-
sentative legislature, to pass entrenched legislation." Id. at 4.
145 See id. at 4-5.




Kong. No law of Hong Kong shall be made after the
coming into operation of the Hong Kong Letters Patent
1991 (No. 2) that restricts the rights and freedoms enjoyed
in Hong Kong in a manner which is inconsistent with that
Covenant as applied to Hong Kong. 47
Many commentators take the position that the Letters Patent,
as amended, entrench the ICCPR rather than the BORO. 4 In
any event, there is general agreement that the amendment at least
"indirectly" entrenches the BORO until the transfer of sovereign-
ty on July 1, 1997, at which time it will continue to enjoy "quasi-
superior status" based on Article 39 of the Basic Law, which
provides that the ICCPR "shall remain in force and shall be
implemented through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region.""'
In order to counter the Chinese government's objection that
adoption of a Bill of Rights would violate the Joint Declaration,
the language of the BORO mirrors in haec verba the wording of
the ICCPR. The British government has used this to argue that
the BORO simply codifies the ICCPR and is consistent with the
Joint Declaration and Article 39 of the Basic Law, which provide
for its continuing application to Hong Kong.
That argument has not laid the Chinese government's
objections to rest. The principal focus of controversy arises out
of Article 3(2) of the BORO, which provides that "[a]ll pre-
existing legislation that does not admit a construction consistent
with this Ordinance is, to the extent of the inconsistency
14 The Hong Kong Letters Patent 1991 (No. 2).
s See Ghai, supra note 143, at 5-6. This is the official position of the
British Government, as articulated by the Secretary of Home Affairs:
The Bill of Rights has a status that is the same as other Hong Kong
ordinances. It is the covenant, not the bill, that is entrenched in the
Letters Patent, Hong Kong's constitutional document.
The Letters Patent provides that no legislation shall be enacted which
is inconsistent with the covenant as applied to Hong Kong. The
Letters Patent will, of course, cease to apply in Hon Kong after June
30, 1997. After that, the Basic Law will in effect entrench the
covenant as applied to Hong Kong.
D.W. Pescod, Ordinance Powers, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24, 1993.
149 Basic Law, supra note 50, art. 39 (emphasis added).
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repealed."1s Pursuant to this provision, the Hong Kong govern-
ment, acting through the Solicitor General, has undertaken a
review of all existing legislation to identify pre-existing laws that
are inconsistent with the BORO and has sought their repeal or
amendment by Legco. According to Solicitor General Daniel
Fung, Q.C., this task is about eighty percent complete."'
The BORO has afforded a degree of protection for civil and
political liberties not previously enjoyed by the citizens of Hong
Kong, or the United Kingdom, for that matter. Since its
enactment in 1991, dozens of court cases, particularly at the level
of the Magistrate's Courts and the District Court, have applied the
BORO to enforce individual liberties.1 12 Although the Court of
Appeals' treatment of the BORO has been criticized by some
commentators as too conservative,5 3 there have been some
significant appellate decisions upholding rights guaranteed in the
BORO and the ICCPR. In R. v. Sin Yau-ming,'" a leading
decision, the Court of Appeal repealed mandatory presumptions
based on possession of certain quantities of narcotics that shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant in prosecutions under the
Dangerous Drugs Ordinance. The court reasoned that such
mandatory suppositions violated the presumption of innocence
guaranteed by Article 11(1) of the BORO."'5
The BORO has also resulted in ordinances repealing or
modifying a number of pre-existing laws deemed inconsistent with
it. These ordinances have effectively nullified laws requiring the
"' Bill of Rights, supra note 52, art. 3(2).
151 Some human rights advocates are not satisfied with the government's
performance to date. In its Briefing Paper for the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, dated October 8, 1995, the Hong Kong Human Rights
Monitor called the government's performance "mixed," anc criticized it for
allowing some provisions to remain in force "and let the citizen challenge it
before the courts." Briefing Paper for the United Nations Human Rights
Committee, Hong Kong Hum. Rts. Monitor, Oct. 8, 1995, at 9-10.
152 See Andrew Byrnes, Director of the Centre for Public and Comparative
Law of the University of Hong Kong, Killing it Softly? The Hong Kong
Courts and the Slow Demise of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights 2 (Sept. 30, 1995
(unpublished manuscript presented at a seminar on Hong Kong and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on file with the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee of International
Human Rights).
153 See id.
154 R. v. Sin Yau-ming, 1 HKIR 127 (1992).




registration of private associations (the Societies Ordinance),
empowering the government to suspend a television broadcaster's
license (Television Ordinance), restricting public demonstrations
(Public Order Ordinance), and authorizing the government to
impose martial law, control transport and suppress publications
during times of civil unrest (Emergency Regulations Ordinance).
Citing these amendments, on October 17, 1995, the Chinese
government and its PWC issued a press release accusing the British
and Hong Kong governments of violating "the principle under the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law that the laws previously in
force in Hong Kong shall remain basically unchanged."156
Asserting that the amendments to the various public order and
media laws "are not conducive to the maintenance of stability of
Hong Kong," the press release announced PWC's conclusion that
the BORO's provision repealing prior inconsistent laws should be
scrapped, and that the repealed laws restricting association, media,
and similar rights must be restored.
1 7
The attack by the Chinese government and the PWC on the
BORO unleashed a furious reaction in Hong Kong. Democratic
Party Chairman Martin Lee called the proposal to reinstate the
repealed laws "pernicious because these laws would stifle public
debate and free expression at a time in our history when freedom
of expression is most critical." 5 ' A host of prominent legal
scholars harshly criticized the proposal in the press; one called it
"constitutional terror," another "unquestionably retrograde." 5 9
Even many China supporters in Hong Kong were critical. For
example, Tsang Yok Sing, Chairman of the pro-Beijing DAB,
disagreed with the PWC's criticism of the BORO and doubted
whether it conflicted with the Basic Law."6
Practically the only defenders of the attack on the BORO
were a few members of the PWC itself. Former Court of Appeal
Justice and PWC member Simon ES. Li informed mission
156 Press Release of the Preliminary Working Committee of the P.R.C.,
Statement by the Legal Sub-group, Oct. 17, 1995.
157 Id.
158 Louis Won, Democrat Fury at Legal Threat, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Oct. 19, 1995, at 5.
159 Lok Wong & Chris Yeung, Law Expert Warns of 'Constitutional Terror',
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 19, 1995, at 5.
1"0 Interview with Tsang Yok Sing, Chairman of DAB, in Hong Kong
(Oct. 28, 1995).
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members that he did not believe Hong Kong needed a Bill of
Rights. According to Li, it is "gilding the lily, like drawing legs
on a snake."' 61
As with the Legco-"through-train" issue, the Chinese
government's opposition to the BORO raises serious questions as
to its intentions concerning the rule of law in Hong Kong.
4. TiHE IMPACT OF THE TRANSITION ON THE HONG KONG
LEGAL SYSTEM
As previously noted, the Hong Kong bar functions in a
manner which largely reflects Hong Kong's status as a British
colony.6 2  A large segment of the bar has been educated in
Great Britain, and virtually all of the proceedings are conducted
in English. The legal profession is divided between solicitors and
barristers, and many other aspects of the English practice are
followed.'63 Hong Kong has a common law system, and the
courts of Hong Kong cite decisions of all common law jurisdic-
tions for their precedential value.
Much of this will change as of July 1, 1997. The Hong Kong
legal system will become a bilingual system. Translating English
words of art into Chinese is no small task. Law professors note
that Chinese equivalents simply do not exist for some common
law terms. Indeed, several barristers and solicitors, including
Hong Kong-born Chinese, confided that they would not feel
comfortable arguing or otherwise dealing with a legal matter in
any language other than English without additional training.
Clearly the magnitude of the change that will take place is great,
considering that for over one hundred years all Hong Kong juries
have been English-speaking, despite the fact that Cantonese is
overwhelmingly the predominant language of the citizenry.'
Although the adoption of bilingualism is the most obvious
change that will occur, other consequences will flow from the
interchange between the mainland Chinese and Hong Kong legal
161 Interview with Simon F.S. Li, Former Court of Appeal Justice and
PWC member, in Hong Kong (Oct. 27, 1995).
162 See discussion supra section 3.3.
163 See discussion supra section 3.3.
161 News accounts report that the first High Court trial to be conducted
entirely in Chinese was scheduled to take place on Dec. 4, 1995. See Cliff





systems. These interchanges, already well underway, are likely to
accelerate substantially. Of particular interest is the extent to
which common law concepts will be operative in the future in
both Hong Kong and mainland China.
Solicitor General Fung notes recent developments which
suggest that mainland China has been looking to modernize its
legal system as a means of fostering economic growth.16 As
part of this exploration, Fung states, China has been studying
common law practices. Since 1987, three law schools in China
have been studying Hong Kong law and translating this law into
Chinese. Fung argues that the interest in Hong Kong law arises
"because its a subset of the common law which carries with it,
relatively speaking, the least foreign cultural baggage. It is the
more accessible and it is perhaps, more politically acceptable
because we will soon be part of one country. .. ."
In response to the adoption of a bilingual system, the Hong
Kong Attorney General's office translated all of the statute books
into Chinese. All future legislation will be drafted bilingually. As
Fung explains:
In other words, we don't just draft in English and translate
[into] Chinese, we have two teams working in tandem, in
English and Chinese, to produce the final results. So we
are able by this process of drafting common law statutes in
the Chinese language to influence the mainland legislative
system in quite a significant way. We supply our materials
to the National People's Congress Legislative Affairs
Commission and they then draft with input from our
laws. So we have given them our bankruptcy law, we
have given them our companies legislation, we have given
them various bits of our commercial legislation and China
has been undergoing a fever-pitch legislative cycle [in] the
last 18 months.
1 7
Hong Kong has also been actively training mainland private
sector lawyers, sending selected lawyers to work in England in a
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barrister's chambers for ten months, then to work in Hong Kong
for two months before returning to China.
Within China, judges have begun training in common law
concepts. In addition, the creation of an independent Chinese bar
is under study. China has also introduced a system of law
reporting, and has published law reports of the Supreme People's
Court since 1992. In Hong Kong, an English edition of the China
Law Reports has been initiated and will be published annually by
Butterworth, a leading law publisher.
Clearly, both the Hong Kong and Chinese legal systems are in
flux. This situation creates both challenges and opportunities for
law schools, bar associations, and all others engaged in legal affairs.
The impact of the interchange between Chinese law and Hong
Kong law will have serious consequences on the development and
preservation of the rule of law for both China and Hong Kong.
It is a process which should be studied closely and to which the
United States should offer whatever assistance it can provide.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As disclosed by an analysis of the salient issues relating to the
transition, there are two major schools of thought which roughly
parallel the political division between the adherents to the pro-
Beijing political parties, such as the DAB and those aligned with
Hong Kong's Democratic Party. Although these parties are often
referred to as the Pro-China and Pro-Democracy factions, these
labels are not helpful. These two groups are better characterized
as those who believe Hong Kong's interests are best served by
adopting a conciliatory, cooperative, and trustful attitude toward
China (the "Trust China" advocates), and those who believe that
Hong Kong's interests are better served by aggressively confront-
ing China whenever and wherever tension exists (the "Confront
China" advocates).
The "Trust China" advocates focus on the P.R.C.'s motivation
to maintain and encourage the enormous contribution Hong Kong
makes to the mainland economy.16 The P.R.C. has already
"' Solicitor General Fung summarizes the economic relationship between
Hong Kong and China as follows:
Hong Kong is the world's fourth biggest trading power, after the
European Union, the U.S. and Japan. It is the fourth largest financial




manifested its intent in the Joint Declaration and Basic Law to
preserve Hong Kong's democratic institutions and free market
economy. The Hong Kong community should give China no
reason to doubt Hong Kong's good faith and desire to cooperate.
It is counter-productive to approach China in a confrontational or
antagonistic fashion. Writing on July 17, 1995, William H.
Overholt, Managing Director of Bankers Trust Hong Kong, and
an officer of Vision 2047, an umbrella organization of Hong Kong
business leaders, stated this view quite bluntly:
Hong Kong has several confrontational anti-Chinese
politicians, for instance [sic], Martin Lee, Emily Lau and
Christine Loh. They thrive only in an atmosphere of
confrontation. They will see their careers ended if the
transition goes well, because China will not accept them
and their view of China as satanic would lose credibility
with their constituents if things went well.'69
The "Trust China" advocates maintain that expressions of
concern over the transition will have adverse economic conse-
quences, and hostility toward China only increases the danger that
some of the dire predictions of the "Confront China" group will
become self-fulfilling prophesies. Rather, they believe China's
own economic and political interests - including those related to
has the world's largest container port. It accounts for some 40% of
China's hard currency earnings and is China's biggest trading partner.
Hong Kong is the biggest gold-capital investor in China, having capital
investments of U.S.$66 billion in China, which dwarfs anything
invested by Japan, the United States, or Taiwan. Conversely, China
is the biggest single investor in Hong Kong.
Remarks, supra note 134. He also emphasizes the cultural ties between the two
entities:
They [Chinese leaders] send their children to school [in Hong Kong],
they buy our stocks, they speculate on our stock markets, they race
in our race track, they buy our properties, they drive our cars, they
wear clothes just like the rest of us.
Id.
169 William H. Overholt, China After Deng Xiaoping, BANKERS TRUST
RESEARCH (uly 17, 1995), at 24. The mission disagrees with the views
expressed by Mr. Overholt, but includes this quotation to highlight the heated
nature of the dispute between the "Trust China" and the "Confront China"
advocates.
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Macau and Taiwan - coincide with those of Hong Kong and
provide an adequate assurance that the rule of law will continue
to flourish in Hong Kong.
The "Confront China" proponents, not surprisingly, focus on
the events in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, and seek to
maximize the ability of Hong Kong to remain free from authori-
tarian control by China. Although they recognize that the Joint
Declaration and Basic Law do provide certain assurances to Hong
Kong, they emphasize the fact that, at one time, China seemed
prepared to go even farther in offering protection to Hong Kong
than its present stance reflects. 70 They fault the British govern-
ment for having too readily compromised the interests of Hong
Kong in exchange for other considerations such as agreement with
respect to the construction of the new Hong Kong airport.
An event which took place in Hong Kong in late October
1995 provides an apt illustration of why reliance on China's
perception of its best interests concerning Hong Kong may not be
enough. When the PWC sub-group's proposals to overturn
certain provisions of the BORO17 1 were made public, consider-
able negative publicity resulted. In an apparent effort to counter
this adverse publicity, three "mainland legal experts," Shao
Tianren, Xiao Weiyan, and Wu Jianfan, came to Hong Kong and
held a meeting at the offices of Xinhua, the New China News
Agency, which serves as the principal representative of the P.R.C.
in Hong Kong. The meeting was closed to all but the 150 District
Affairs Advisors who had been designated by China and who may
fairly be characterized as pro-China advocates.' 2 Although the
meeting was closed to the public, press reports indicate that at the
end of two hours of lectures, the speakers announced that the
briefing session was over. Despite the fact that the assembled
audience intended to be favorable to China, the speakers gave no
70 For example, Martin Lee states that in 1987, when he was a member of
the P.R.C.-appointed Basic Law Drafting Committee and the principal
negotiator with China concerning the Court of Final Appeal, he proposed, and
Chinese government representatives agreed, that a majority of that Court
would be comprised of visiting judges who were not Chinese nationals, a
position which China now rejects. See discussion supra section 3.3.
171 See discussion supra section 3.4.
172 China Confronters perceived the meeting to be illustrative of the





opportunity to any attendees to ask questions or express their
views." Press reports also noted that the lecturers spoke in
Mandarin, even though Cantonese is the overwhelmingly
predominant dialect spoken in Hong Kong.174
Second-hand oral reports suggest that no attempt was made to
explain the legal arguments which have been advanced by those
urging repeal of certain provisions of the BORO. 75 Rather, the
thrust of the remarks made by the spokesmen for China was that
the questioned Bill of Rights provisions were manifestations of an
anti-Chinese conspiracy on the part of Britain and other enemies
of China. Reference was made to the Opium Wars which resulted
in China's original loss of Hong Kong and the humiliation it now
seeks to redress.
"Confront China" proponents who discussed this meeting
were hopeful that it might shake the confidence of those attending
the meeting in their belief that one can safely rely on China's own
self-interest in Hong Kong. According to one legislator, this may
have been the first occasion on which certain pro-China Hong
Kong residents were exposed to the delivery of a mandate from
the mainland for which their views or comments were not
solicited or welcomed.
Recognizing that reports of the mainland legal experts' visit to
Hong Kong come primarily from China confronters, the mission
nevertheless concludes that, at least as of October 31, China's
attempt to deal with the negative publicity concerning its
opposition to certain Bill of Rights provisions was a public
relations disaster. This raises the question of whether such
conduct is symptomatic of the larger problem: whether the
differences in political traditions and attitudes between the P.R.C.
and the leaders of Hong Kong are so vast that China and Hong
Kong may each act contrary to its own best interests, not by
design, but inadvertently out of lack of familiarity with or
sensitivity to the needs of the other.
The mission concludes that the process of education in which
the leaders of both China and Hong Kong must participate will
be aided, not hindered, by full and free debate in Hong Kong and
173 See China Talks Down to Hong Kong, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31,
1995, at A3.
174 See id.
175 See discussion supra section 3.4.
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elsewhere of the critical issues surrounding the transition. Hong
Kong is a vibrant and thriving world center, richly endowed with
able, energetic, and devoted civic and legal leaders. Hong Kong
will not be "killed" if public focus is directed to those areas in the
Hong Kong/Chinese relationship which are potential trouble
spots.
It is unrealistic to suppose that legislation can be enacted that
will fully protect Hong Kong from every conceivable exercise of
sovereignty on the part of China which might have an adverse
impact on Hong Kong. But there is a benefit in debating over
these provisions. When the views of the China confronters
prevail in whole or in part, a potential trouble spot is removed or
minimized. When the China confronters do not succeed, they
have nevertheless served the worthwhile purpose of alerting China
and the world to the significance of the issue.
The concern is not that the current debates will suggest to the
P.R.C. how, if it wished, it might impair Hong Kong's present
status. Nor does the mission believe that the vigorous assertion
by the China confronters of their concerns will cause China to
view Hong Kong with greater suspicion or lack of confidence.
In short, the mission rejects the notion that one should gloss
over potential areas of conflict and act as if reliance on China's
self-interest is all that is needed to preserve the rule of law in
Hong Kong. For that reason, this report does not refrain from
discussing the various contentions with respect to transitional
issues. The line between law and politics is not always clearly
defined and this report has attempted to avoid expressing purely
political views. The mission does believe, however, that an
exposition of the various issues and how their resolution may
affect the rule of law in Hong Kong is a worthwhile endeavor.
5.1. The Rule of Law in Hong Kong Will Require Careful World-
Wide Monitoring
The threat to the preservation of the rule of law in Hong
Kong is not so much that China will deliberately act contrary to
its own best interests which coincide with the best interests of
Hong Kong. Rather, it is that China will act contrary to its best
interests concerning Hong Kong out of a lack of understanding or
sympathy towards the vastly different traditions and beliefs of that




the Hong Kong-China transition on an international level is
beneficial and should be encouraged.
China, and indeed some residents of Hong Kong, have
expressed the view that foreign observers, especially human rights
monitors, have been inappropriately hostile towards China. They
have, therefore, been regarded as unwanted meddlers in China's
internal affairs. This attitude on the part of China, however,
should not deter the monitoring of events in mainland China or
Hong Kong which impact the preservation of the rule of law.
In any event, the Hong Kong-China transition is in no sense
purely an internal Chinese matter. The transition of a capitalist
society with a common law-based legal system from a crown
colony to a region of China is by its very nature an event of
international concern. The political, economic, and other interests
the free world has in Hong Kong are of vast proportions. The
Hong Kong experience will be watched with interest with respect
to the Portuguese colony of Macau, which passes to Chinese
sovereignty in 1999. The Transition will also inevitably affect the
outcome of the conflict over the future status of Taiwan. The
ability of Hong Kong to maintain its role as a major world
financial center depends in large measure on international
perception as to whether Hong Kong will continue to be a stable
environment, politically and economically, with faithful adherence
to the rule of law.
All of these reasons mandate that those concerned with the
worldwide maintenance of the rule of law continue to carefully
monitor events occurring in Hong Kong. It is also imperative
that this monitoring continue well beyond July 1, 1997. Many
have expressed the view that the risks to Hong Kong's preserva-
tion of the rule of law and of its economy will not be as great in
the early years of the transition as they will be in the later years,
when world attention on Hong Kong will have abated and the
temptation for exploitation may have increased.
United States-China relations are extremely delicate and are
likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. In particular, issues
relating to trade, Taiwan, alleged sales by China of nuclear
materials, and alleged human rights violations within mainland
China will have a significant effect on the dialogue between the
two countries. It is imperative that questions relating to the
preservation of the rule of law in Hong Kong not be overlooked
or compromised because attention is focused elsewhere.
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5.2. Proposal for an On-Going Relationship Between the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York and the
Hong Kong Legal Community
The ties between the New York bar and the Hong Kong legal
community are numerous. Because of the concern of many of
Hong Kong's leaders that the transition to Chinese rule be viewed
positively, several of them have come to New York and will come
in the future to address members of the New York bar. 76 The
mission recommends that the Association be prepared to deal, in
an ongoing manner, with matters of mutual interest to the New
York and Hong Kong legal establishments. A key aspect of this
involvement is forming and maintaining a relationship with the
Hong Kong legal establishment, including the Hong Kong Bar
Association and the Law Society of Hong Kong.
The details of this proposal should be worked through in the
next few months, with the goal of providing the Hong Kong legal
establishment and other interested parties assurance that our
interest in Hong Kong is not ephemeral and that the New York
City Bar Association is prepared to speak up whenever it may be
useful to preserve the rule of law in Hong Kong. The leaders of
both the Hong Kong Bar Association and the Law Society of
Hong Kong expressed great enthusiasm when this proposal was
tentatively advanced.





Members of the Mission to Hong Kong met with the
following persons:
MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY
HON. HENRY LITTON, Vice President, Supreme Court, Court
of Appeal; HON. ANTHONY G. ROGERS, Judge of the High
Court; HON. SIR TI LIANG YANG, Chief Justice, The Supreme
Court of Hong Kong.
MEMBERS OF LEGCO AND THE HONG KONG GOVERNMENT
HON. DANIEL R. FUNG, Solicitor General; R.J.E HOARE,
OBE, J-P, Director of Administration, Government Secretariat;
HON. MARTIN C.M. LEE, Q.C., Legislative Councillor; HON.
CHRISTINE LOH, Legislative Councillor; CECILIA TSUNG,
Executive Officer (Visits), Government Information Services.
MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
PROF. JOHANNES M.M. CHAN, Dept. of Law, University
of Hong Kong; GEORGE EDWARDS, ESQ., Centre for Compara-
tive and Public Law, University of Hong Kong; T.C. Foo, ESQ.,
T.C. Foo & Co. Solicitors & Notaries; PAUL HARRIS, ESQ.,
Human Rights Monitor; SIMON S.O. IP, ESQ., Law Society;
GLADYS LI, Q.C., CHAIR, H.K. Bar Association; HON. SIMON
F.S. LI, Q.C., Director, The Bank of East Asia Ltd.; VINCENT
LIANG, ESQ., Lo & Lo, Law Society; PROF. DEREK ROEBUCK,
Professor of Comparative Law; PETER K.P. SIT, Council Member,
The Law Society of Hong Kong; PROF. RAYMOND WACKS,
Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong; RODERICK BUN WOO,
ESQ., President, The Law Society of Hong Kong.
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JENNIFER E. BLAND, Vice Consul, U.S. Consul General;
ANDREW CHOA, Senior Advisor, Russell Reynolds Associates,
Inc.; DAVID R. HALPERIN, Coudert Brothers; ALAN R.J. HO,
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ESQ.; SIR JOSEPH HOTUNG; MR. JOHN KAMM; KEVIN LAU
CHUN To, Ming Pao Newspapers, HK Journalists Assoc.;
CHRISTINE MAR, Executive Director, Vision 2047 Foundation;
MARK MICHELSON, Warren Williams International Ltd.; MI-
CHAEL MORGAN, ESQ., American Chamber of Commerce;
WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, Managing Director, Bankers Trust
Company; STEPHEN A. SCHLAIKJER, Deputy Principal Officer,
U.S. Consul General; GARY SILVERMAN, Correspondent, Far
Eastern Economic Review; DOUGLAS G. SPELMAN, Ph.D., Chief
Economic/Political Section, U.S. Consul General; HON. TSANG
YOK-SING, Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong
Kong.
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